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ABSTRACT
Economic theory and evidence from a variety of debt markets shed light on current reform proposals
concerning emerging market debt. Debt markets, including the U.S. municipal bond market,
generally function best when the rights of creditors are protected most effectively. Since current IMF
reform proposals significantly emasculate creditor rights, they are likely to have an adverse effect








The market for sovereign debt of developing countries is alleged to be gravely ill.  In the last five
years, several East Asian countries, Russia, Argentina, and other borrowers defaulted on their
sovereign bonds.  Financial crises in borrower countries, as well as prolonged, messy and litigious
debt  renegotiations accompanied these defaults.  Some see the so-called "rogue creditors," who sue
to get their money back and delay settlement, as the culprit of the market’s problems (White 2002).
To confront them, reformers propose to change debt restructuring procedures by reducing creditor
rights.  The IMF in particular advocates using some features of U.S. Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcy
that are favorable to borrowers in sovereign debt restructuring (Krueger 2002).
This paper uses the experiences with bankruptcy in other debt markets to reexamine sovereign
debt restructuring.  I argue that the ailment of sovereign debt markets has been mis-diagnosed.
Experience shows that debt markets work best when the rights of creditors are protected most
effectively.   From this perspective, the troubles afflicting sovereign debt markets result from creditor
rights being too weak, not too strong. 
There is a more evocative way to put this point.  As Secretary of the Treasury, Lawrence
Summers asked: Why can U.S. municipalities borrow at such low rates, and have such low rates of
default, compared to sovereign borrowers?  How can the sovereign debt market become more like
U.S. municipal bond market, with few defaults and low interest rates?  The answer, I believe, is that
creditor rights vis-a-vis defaulting U.S. municipalities are much greater than those of lenders vis-a-vis
their defaulting sovereign borrowers.  As a consequence, defaulting municipalities repay their
creditors in full or almost in full, and municipal bond markets function well.
The objective of the paper is to consider how sovereign debt markets can be improved.  Some
academics believe that the problems of sovereignty doom these markets.  Except for very good2
borrowers who care about their reputation, the markets should not really exist (Bulow 2002).  
According to this view, existing debt should be forgiven and replaced with foreign aid.  This view
may well be correct.  Still, in this paper, I focus on the possibility of improving the sovereign debt
market rather than writing it off. 
I.  The Structure of Debt Contracts.  
Debt is a contract, in which the borrower accepts some money and agrees to pay it back.   If
the borrower fails to repay, the creditor acquires certain rights and powers vis-a-vis his assets.  Except
for some possible  reputational concerns, those rights are the main reason that borrowers ever pay
back (Hart 1995).   
A typical debt contract is collateralized. The lender’s most basic power is to seize the
collateral of a defaulting borrower.  This power supports the mortgage market in the U.S., much of
personal lending, as well as standard liquidation-focused bankruptcy procedures in most countries.
For several good economic reasons, grabbing and liquidating collateral can be inefficient.  As
a consequence, softer bankruptcy procedures have emerged in many debt markets.  In the personal
debt market, some assets of the borrower are exempt from being seized by the creditors. Likewise,
many legal jurisdictions replace liquidation with reorganization, in which a plan for the borrower to
pay back the lender is developed under the supervision of a court, averting the seizure of assets.
In the United States, this alternative bankruptcy procedure for corporations is known as
Chapter 11.  In Chapter 11, the management of a defaulting company has a few months to present the
court with a reorganization and repayment plan.  During this period, management retains control,
creditors cannot grab assets, and the company can borrow fresh capital to continue operations.   If the3
creditors do not accept the management’s plan, they can propose an alternative, which might seek to
replace the management or to liquidate the company.  Crucially, under the law, the objective of the
court is to choose a plan "in the best interest of the creditors."   
In many U.S. states, municipalities unlike corporations cannot seek bankruptcy protection
from creditors at all.  In a few instances, municipalities can seek and have sought such protection,
known as Chapter 9.  This municipal bankruptcy procedure follows some of the principles of Chapter
11, but further weakens creditor rights.  Municipal government is not replaced and the creditors are
not allowed to propose competing  plans.  At the same time, the law continues to clearly specify that
any repayment plan must be "in the best interests of the creditors" (McConnell and Picker 1993).  In
addition, state governments in the U.S. appear to take responsibility for municipal debts, and to
intervene aggressively in the fiscal affairs of defaulting municipalities.  The work of the Municipal
Assistance  Corporation in New York City and the assistance to Orange County by the California
state government both show that defaulting local governments lose much of their fiscal sovereignty.
     The U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy -- and relatedly municipal Chapter 9 bankruptcy -- is one of
the softest (nicest to debtors) bankruptcy procedures in the world (see, e.g., La Porta et al. 1998). 
Even the possibility of reorganization, as opposed to liquidation, does not exist in some advanced
market economies.  Management in the U.S. can unilaterally seek Chapter 11 protection from
creditors, whereas in many other countries creditor consent is required to initiate bankruptcy.  In the
U.S., secured creditors cannot grab assets (there is an automatic stay on assets), which they can do
in about half of the developed countries.  Perhaps most unusually, in the U.S.  management stays after
filing for bankruptcy. Consistent with this picture, most studies of the U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy
see it is as too slow, too soft on the existing management, and often ineffective in setting the company4
on the path to economic recovery (Hotchkiss 1995, Kahl 2002a, 2002b).
Yet even in Chapters 11 and 9, creditors have legal rights counterbalancing the softness of the
procedure.  In Chapter 11, the management makes its proposal under the threat of alternative
proposals from creditors that might involve its removal or liquidation of the company.   And in
evaluating proposals, courts in both Chapters 11 and 9 have a clear obligation to choose one in the
best interest of the creditors. 
These powers of the creditors are the main reason that borrowers pay back and debt markets
exist and prosper.  The more the creditors can recover from a defaulting borrower, and the more
cheaply they can do so, the more they would lend to begin with, and on more attractive terms.
The sticks in the form of creditor rights are not the only reason why borrowers pay back. 
There are also carrots that encourage borrowers to settle with creditors.  The main carrot in the cases
of personal and municipal bankruptcy is the ability to borrow again.  For corporations, the benefits
of settling with creditors and emerging from bankruptcy include avoidance of liquidation, the ability
of managers to keep their jobs and get paid, and the resumption of dividends and unrestricted
borrowing.  The combination of sticks and carrots allows the various debt markets to function.    
II.  Creditor Rights and Debt Markets.
In the data, the stronger are creditor rights in the event of a default, the better developed are
the debt markets.  In the case of personal bankruptcy, creditor rights differ across the U.S. states.
Some states have a much larger personal exemption  the assets beyond the reach of creditors in the
event of personal bankruptcy  than do others.  The available evidence shows that, looking across
states, higher exemptions reduce the amount of credit available to low asset households (Gropp,5
Scholtz and White 1997), raise the costs and reduce the availability of mortgages (Lin and White
2001), and reduce small firms’ access to credit (Berkowitz and White 2002).  
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) examine the relationship between creditor rights and the size of
debt markets in 49 countries.  They construct an index of creditor rights based on legal rules
governing the automatic stay on assets, the respect for seniority of creditors, the restrictions on going
into reorganization, and the replacement of management  in bankruptcy.  The authors present
evidence suggesting that countries with stronger creditor rights have larger debt markets (see also
Stulz and Williamson 2002).  The evidence also shows that greater legal shareholder rights are
associated with broader and more valuable equity markets.
The few existing municipal bankruptcies illustrate a similar pattern. Courts expect creditors
to be repaid, and generally speaking, they are repaid in full or nearly in full, and with only a short
delay.  This is done through municipal tax increases, expenditure cuts, as well as assistance from
state governments in the form of cash or guarantees of long term bonds. Because they know they have
to repay, municipalities borrow moderately, and lenders provide funds at low rates.  There is even
insurance against municipal default, pointing to the insignificance of moral hazard problems.   In light
of the evidence, the answer to Summers’ question is straightforward: the municipal bond market in
the U.S. functions so well, with low spreads and few defaults, because creditors’ rights are sufficient
to get paid in full after a default.
III.  Sovereign Debt Markets. 
Sovereign debt markets could not be more different.  Some countries borrow massively 
often to the point where both they and the lenders know they cannot pay back   and at interest rates6
that reflect the high likelihood of default.  They default with some regularity, and when they do, often
pay back a fraction of what they have borrowed, even when they have the ability to pay, as was the
case in Russia in 1998.  Debt renegotiation takes years, and is accompanied by massive litigation.
In short, in this market, unlike in the municipal bond market, over-borrowing, default and limited
repayment are completely normal and expected by both borrowers and lenders.
As Bulow and Rogoff (1989a, 1989b) showed in now-classic papers, this is exactly what one
would expect in a market where lenders have no power.  Because the borrowers in sovereign debt
markets are, well, sovereign, creditors have virtually no rights.  Creditors cannot grab assets in the
country  the most they can do is to seize a few airplanes or barges of oil, which does not get them
far except as a strategy of harassment. Management (i.e., government) is not replaced.  Countries
default unilaterally, without the consent of creditors.  Last but not least, there are no courts with
authority over sovereign states whose mandate is to protect the interest of creditors.   Bulow and
Rogoff conclude by suggesting that there is no good reason why the sovereign debt market exists.
The situation is not quite this dire, since at least some sticks and carrots are available.  One
power of the creditors, recognized by Bulow and Rogoff, is to disrupt and litigate, since sovereign
debt contracts are signed under international law.  As importantly, sovereign borrowers settle with
their creditors because they want to borrow again, and run the risk that the fresh loans are seized by
the old creditors unless there is a settlement.  Under the current system, sovereigns in default continue
some borrowing from the IMF and in local markets under domestic law.  To resume borrowing in
international markets, sovereigns settle with creditors and pay them more than zero.  Indeed, local
financial markets interpret settlement with creditors as very good news (Arslanalp and Henry 2002).
The development community is quite unhappy with the status quo, and in particular with the7
litigation and disruption surrounding sovereign default.   Such litigation delays settlement, possibly
prolonging recessions and raising the cost of  IMF programs.  There is also a concern that the
payment to creditors is in part subsidized by the IMF loans, which puts political and economic
pressure on the Fund to demand that burdens be shared. 
In making reform proposals, the IMF has two admirable objectives.  The first is for sovereign
states to be able to borrow at low rates in private international markets to finance their development.
The second is for sovereign states not to pay their creditors back, especially during the times of
economic distress. The tension between these objectives explains the challenges of reform.
The current proposals focus  at least superficially  on making sovereign bankruptcy more
like the U.S. Chapter 11.   There are three key elements of the current IMF proposal.  The first is
collective action clauses in debt renegotiations, the purpose of which is to make it more difficult for
"rogue" or "maverick" creditors to opt out of proposed settlement agreements and litigate.  The IMF
indeed argues that the goal of its proposals is to limit the rights of these minority creditors, rather than
of all creditors.   The second feature is the creation of a sovereign bankruptcy court, which at the time
of the initial proposal was intended to be the IMF itself, but is now envisaged as an independent
agency.  Third, in parallel to U.S. Chapter 11, the sovereign in default will be allowed to borrow in
arrears so that its economy is not disrupted, and the new debt will be senior to the existing debt.  
In the discussions of the IMF proposals, collective action clauses have received by far the
most attention.  Roubini (2002) explains persuasively why the problem of "rogue creditors" is vastly
overstated.  Lenders are already under tremendous pressure to settle with sovereign borrowers, since
any lender who does not agree to a proposed debt exchange or other settlement risks receiving
nothing.  Collective action clauses increase the pressure to settle on the borrower’s terms.  Litigation8
is one of the few  relatively weak  powers the lenders have if they do not like these terms.  Indeed,
many of the recent settlements    unlike those for municipal debt in the U.S.   take place on terms
highly favorable to the borrowers.  This is wonderful ex post for countries in financial crisis, but
unlikely to be conducive to the long term health of the sovereign debt market. 
The creation of a bankruptcy court can be a very beneficial development for the sovereign
debt market if, like the courts in U.S. municipal bankruptcy, the objective of settlement is to best
serve the interests of creditors.  Of course, the objective of the IMF  again admirable ex post but
incompatible with long term health of the market  is exactly the opposite.  It wants the court to
protect the country from creditors rather than to serve their interests.  
But perhaps the crucial  and most neglected  feature of the IMF proposal is a radical
increase of lending into arrears.   The development objective here is clear and laudable: such
borrowing can finance exports and deficit spending and thereby relieve economic hardship.  But basic
logic, as well as the evidence discussed in the previous section, suggest that this reform is likely to
damage the market by eliminating the crucial carrot that allows recovery by creditors.  If the country
can borrow fresh funds without repaying old debt, it has no incentive to pay creditors anything, and
in fact has every reason to remain in "sovereign bankruptcy" forever.  The crucial features of U.S.
Chapter 11 which counterbalance borrowing in arrears  the threats of liquidation or of acceptance
of the creditors’ reorganization plan by the judge  do not exist for sovereign debt.  Without these
threats, and with the possibility of continued borrowing senior to the old loans, there is no reason to
repay.  And with no reason to repay, there is no sovereign debt market in the long run.
In summary, all the proposals by the IMF share a common element: they reduce creditor
rights.  These ideas serve the admirable goal of reducing the burden of default on debtor countries.9
Yet, by cherry-picking the features of Chapter 11 most favorable to creditors, these proposals ignore
the delicate balance between debtor protections and creditor rights that exists in both Chapter 11 and
Chapter 9. As all the evidence indicates, enhancing borrower rights while emasculating creditor rights
is unlikely to promote the health of emerging debt markets.
IV.   Alternatives.
Sovereign debt markets are likely to shrink if the IMF’s proposals are adopted, at least for
developing countries.  Indeed, governments of several significant emerging market borrowers oppose
these proposals, precisely because they recognize the consequences of weakening creditor rights for
their ability to borrow in the future.  Still, there may well exist good strategies for reform. Such
strategies  must look at successful institutions in their entirety, including both debtor protections and
creditor rights.
Traditional collateralized lending, supported by the creditors’ right to seize collateral, can
probably be expanded even in emerging markets.  Countries can pledge their natural resource export
revenues, for example, especially when there is no practical way to stop production and export.
Mexico successfully pledged a portion of its oil revenues to the United States during the 1995 rescue,
and there is no reason why this experience could not become more common.  
Relatedly, the IMF could encourage sovereign issuance of securities whose returns are linked
to commodity prices or economic performance.  Such equity-like securities would require lower
payment during economic hardship, and higher payments in times of prosperity.  They would avoid
many of the problems of self-fulfilling crises that the IMF is concerned with.10
But suppose that the reformers wish to pursue bankruptcy procedures similar to Chapter 9 or
11, the concern about the softness of these procedures notwithstanding.   These reforms could  include
collective action clauses and lending into arrears.  However, if they do, they could only work if
counterbalanced by other features of Chapters 9 and 11.  The most crucial of these is the presence of
a court with power to enforce its decisions and a duty to find solutions that best serve the interests of
creditors.  To be effective, such a court must stay away from pursuing development objectives. It
should also have jurisdiction over both sovereign borrowers and their lenders, including the IMF.
If the analogy to Chapter 11 is taken seriously, creditors should also be able to present to the
court restructuring plans that compete with the proposals of the borrowers (perhaps going second).
As long as these proposals are feasible, they should be considered by the court, which should select
and enforce the plan "in the best interest of the creditors."  Likewise, if the development community
wishes to imitate the success of the U.S. municipal bond market by pursuing a procedure like Chapter
9, mechanisms of takeover of national finances by an international authority must be considered.
Caballero and Dornbusch (2002) make precisely such a proposal for Argentina. 
In the end, a supra-national bankruptcy court may or may not be feasible.  But such a court
is essential if sovereign default and bankruptcy are to proceed as smoothly as the IMF wants.  The
success of the municipal bond market in the U.S. suggests that a bankruptcy procedure for a
government can work well.  But the foundation of such a procedure is the existence of a credible
arbiter whose mandate is to protect creditor rights.  Without exception, the powers of such an arbiter
in every kind of bankruptcy entail some loss of sovereignty by the borrower.  Without such an arbiter,
however, the loose analogies to Chapter 11 lose credibility.  It would be better to leave the market
alone. Despite all the turmoil, it has delivered vast amounts of private capital to the developing world.1112
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